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Crucially, both were property-related bubbles, commercial in Japan and residential in America. Ironically, after the BoJ raised rates and burst the bubble, American bankers and policymakers were quick to lecture the Japanese. With four-fifths of Japanese lending ultimately related to property, Americans were incredulous that banks had been foolish enough to lend against collateral for which the value could go down as up; in the United States, they said, banks lent against cash flow, the best gauge of a borrower's ability to repay a debt. Japan got into the mess by assuming land prices only rose (in cities they have since fallen by about 70%). But American financiers have made the same silly assumptions, gaily advancing money to “ninjas”: people with no income, no job and no assets. Even if some local property markets tanked, they figured, a nationwide bust was almost unthinkable. They were very wrong.

本质上，这两者都是资产价格泡沫，日本是商业性的，美国是住房性的。讽刺的是，在日本央行提高利率并刺破这一泡沫的时候，美国银行家和政策制定者却迅速的对日本进行说教。因为日本的借贷行为中五分之四是基于资产的，美国人就怀疑说，日本银行太过愚蠢，依据抵押资产的价值放贷，然而其价格可升亦可降；在美国，他们声称，银行是依据现金流放贷，是翻译借款人还款能力的最佳指标。日本之所以陷入困境是因为认为土地价格只会上涨（在城市中土地价格此后下跌了约70%）。但美国的金融家门也犯了同样愚蠢的错误，大方的把钱借给“忍者们“——一些既无收入，又无工作和任何财产的人。即使部分地区的地产市场崩溃了，他们认为，一场全国性的崩盘几乎是不可想象的。他们完完全全的错了。

One reason the approach of both crises was widely missed was that most of the warning signs were not at parent banks but in affiliates, subsidiaries and other murky offshoots. In Japan such affiliates were often the parent bank's biggest customers. Yet these did not feel bound to make provisions against souring assets. After all, if things really came to a pass, they believed the parent would bail them out. Also, much of the big banks' lending went to smaller banks, which lent the money on—to subprime borrowers. This chain of property lending kept problems at arm's-length for too long, says Tetsuro Sugiura, chief economist at Mizuho Research Institute. “Had we had integrated balance sheets reflecting the whole picture of banks' lending, we would have been able to recognise the problems much sooner.” That might ring a bell.

为何大家会普遍的错过解决这两场危机的机会？原因之一就是由于绝大部分的警示信号出现在加盟机构、子公司或其它未知的分支机构，而不是出现在母公司。在日本，诸如此类的加盟机构是母公司（即银行）的最大客户。他们也没有紧迫感要制定限制措施来预防变质的资产。毕竟，如果真的无法控制了，他们相信母公司会出手相救。同时，大部分的大银行将资金借给小银行，小银行再降钱借给次级借款人。这么漫长的借贷链条使得大银行鞭长莫及， Mizuho Research Institute的首席经济学家Tetsuro Sugiura说。“如果我们有合并报表可以反映整个银行的借贷行为，我们也许可以早点发现这个问题”。那也许敲响了警钟。

The ability of financial crises to spread out from their spawning grounds is also all too familiar. Once Japan's banks were seen as tainted, they were unable to raise funds in the short-term money markets. As a consequence, they scaled back lending to corporate clients (including those overseas), which quickly felt the pain. Unable to raise money from banks or in the capital markets, Japanese companies stopped lending to each other: trade credit, which had accounted for about a third of all lending, dried up.

金融危机从他们最初发端的领域不断蔓延的能力也极其相似。一旦日本的银行被认为与危机有染，他们就无法再从短期资金市场中筹集资金。因此，他们就收回了对公司客户的借贷（包括部分海外公司），这些公司立刻感到了难处。由于无法从银行或资本市场获得资金，日本企业开始停止互相借贷：由此，占据了三分之一的借贷行为的商业借贷，枯竭了。

Meanwhile, depositors took their money out of banks and stuffed it in the post office or under their mattresses. This aggravated the crisis in the banking system. The first estimate of banks' bad loans made by the Ministry of Finance in the early 1990s put them at ¥8 trillion ($8 billion); a decade later, banking analysts reckoned the figure was closer to ¥200 trillion.

同时，储户从银行取出了他们的存款，放到邮局或者藏在床垫地下。这加剧了银行系统的危机。财政部在90年代初预计银行系统的坏账大约为8万亿日元（80亿美元）；十年后，银行分析师预测这一数字接近200万亿日元。

Some will argue that the speed with which American banks and their regulators have addressed the subprime crisis renders all other comparisons invalid. For Japan dithered mightily in tackling its problems. At first, it was assumed that property prices would soon resume their happy rise. Until at least 1994, regulators actively colluded with banks to hide the scale of bad loans. It was not the late 1990s that the government stepped in to bail out the banking system, and it only got serious about banks tackling their bad loans after 2002—12 years after the bubble burst.

有人说美国银行业和监管机构对次贷危机的迅速反使得上述所有的比较都是无意义的。而日本则在解决自身问题方面犹豫不决。最初，大家预计资产价格会很快恢复上升势头。到至少1994年，监管部门还积极窜通银行隐藏坏账的规模。直到90年代末，政府才出面解救银行系统，并且直到2002年后，日本银行才认真解决坏账问题——这已经是泡沫破裂后的12年。

Undoubtedly America's fast-moving crisis has bred a quicker response. Yet Japanese economists and central bankers see familiar dangers in market-propping intervention that clouds transparency and prevents asset prices from quickly reaching a new equilibrium. The administration's desire to cap some mortgage rates is one example. More worrying, they say, is its backing for the “superfund” proposed by Citigroup, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase into which all sorts of toxic assets might be poured, out of sight and out of mind. But no Schadenfreude exists in Japan. After all, the subprime crisis also threatens the economic recovery that Japan desperately desires.

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